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1.
Abstract.- In this paper I inquire about the eﬀects initial wealth has on
black-white diﬀerences in early employment careers. I set up a dynamic
model in which individuals simultaneously search for a job and accumu-
late wealth, and ﬁt it to data from the National Longitudinal Survey
(1979-cohort). The estimates show that borrowing constraints are tight
for both race groups. Regime changes reveal that diﬀerences in initial
wealth account almost fully for the racial gap in wealth and wages at
the beginning of employment careers, but their eﬀect tapers oﬀ and com-
pletely dissapears several years after graduation. In contrast, diﬀerences
in the labor market environment and in preferences are shown to account
fully for both racial gaps, in wealth and in wages, persisting several years
after High School graduation.
Keywords: Job search, wealth, racial diﬀerences, borrowing constraints,
consumption, unemployment, estimation of dynamic structural models.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C33, E21, E24, J64.
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1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a growing interest in the black-white wealth gap.
Whereas historically income disparity between blacks and whites has narrowed down
(Smith and Welch 1989), wealth disparity remains large. Thus, while blacks earn
between 50% and 64% of whites’ income, blacks’ wealth is only between 12% and 20%
of whites’ wealth (Blau and Graham 1990, Wolﬀ 1994, Menchik and Jianakoplos 1997,
Oliver and Shapiro 1997, Scholz and Levine 2003). Recent studies have focused on
t h er o l eo fd i ﬀerences in income, education, and patterns of marriage and fertility
to explain racial gaps in wealth levels and growth rates (Gittleman and Wolﬀ 2004,
Altonji and Doraszelski 2005). I, on the other hand, examine whether causality may
be also working in the opposite direction, that is, whether initial wealth disparity
explains black-white diﬀerences in employed wages and employment rates for High
School graduates Therefore, throughout this paper I report diﬀerences in wages (the
income of the employed) and in the unemployment rate rather than total diﬀerences
in income, as in other studies. In order to abstract from wage diﬀerences caused by
skill gaps (Neal and Johnson 1996, Neal 2005), I restrict the analysis to individuals
with the same level of schooling. Subsequently, I estimate a dynamic model of wealth
accumulation and job search and ﬁnd that initial wealth has essentially no inﬂuence in
explaining racial disparities several years after High School graduation in comparison
with labor market variables. Initial wealth only accounts for the racial gap in wealth
and wages at the beginning of employment careers. By contrast, diﬀerences in the
labor market environment and in preferences are shown to account fully for both racial
gaps, in wealth and in wages, persisting several years after High School graduation.
Imperfect capital markets allow wealth to aﬀect job search outcomes: wealthier
agents can search longer and obtain higher wages. This eﬀect is formalized in a utility-
maximizing job search model where agents’ reservation wages depend positively on
their wealth levels. Thus, wealth accumulation becomes part of the optimal job search
strategy in which unemployed agents run down their wealth to maintain consumption4
levels, and employed agents accumulate wealth to hedge against future unemployment
spells, which also allows them to move to better paying jobs.
Utility-maximizing job search models are based on the seminal work of Danforth
(1979), who analyzed in detail the role of wealth on an individual’s optimal job search
strategy. In his framework, only the unemployed look for a job and receive wage oﬀers
from a non-degenerate distribution; the employed do not search and do not become
unemployed and there is no decision about search intensity. In recent years several
empirical studies have attempted to test utility-maximizing search models inspired
in Danforth’s basic framework. In this paper I generalize Danforth’s model to allow
for on-the-job search, wage growth, variations of arrival and layoﬀ r a t e sa saf u n c t i o n
of age, retirement age, and a parametric limit on borrowing. In particular, I assume
a parametric initial wealth distribution and unobserved heterogeneity with diﬀerent
types of individuals who diﬀer in their labor market environments, initial wealth
distributions, borrowing constraints, and preferences. These features allow my model
to generate predicted life-cycle trajectories and distributions of employment status,
wealth, and wages that match the observed ones.
The behavioral parameters of the model are recovered using the method surveyed
by Rust (1988) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1989). I use the numerical solution to the
joint job search and consumption problem to construct a distance function between
the observed and the predicted paths of wealth, wages, and employment transitions,
which is minimized over the behavioral parameters. This approach has been used by
Wolpin (1992), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Keane and Wolpin (2000), and Bowlus
and Eckstein (2002) to study black-white labor market diﬀerences and to conduct
policy experiments. I study the eﬀects on wealth accumulation and labor market
outcomes of regime changes consisting of assigning blacks the labor market conditions,
initial wealth distribution and access to credit, and preferences of whites.
A regime change that gives blacks the labor market conditions of whites is able
to generate full convergence in labor market outcomes both in the short and in the5
long run. If, additionally, there is a switch in taste parameters, this regime change
can also eliminate long run wealth disparity, although not the initial wealth gap. On
the contrary, a shift in initial wealth and access to credit fails to substantially narrow
down the long run racial wealth and wageg a p s ,b u ti ti st h eo n l yr e g i m ec h a n g e
that accomplishes the elimination of both race gaps at the beginning of employment
careers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the
data source, the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience - Youth
Cohort (NLSY), the selection of the sample, and the descriptive statistics; Section 3
describes the theoretical model; Section 4 explains the simulated method of moments
estimation procedure; Section 5 analyzes the estimation results; Section 6 assesses,
both formally and graphically, the performance of the model in replicating the main
trends of the data, and Section 7 presents regime changes based on the estimated
parameters of the model. The main conclusions of the paper are summarized in
Section 7.
2D a t a
The National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience - Youth Cohort (NLSY)
contains data on household composition, military experience, school enrollment, and
a week by week account of employment status, hourly wages, hours worked, and em-
ployers. An individual’s complete weekly work history can be constructed from 1978
until 1993. Respondents whose employment histories started before 1978, i.e., those
b o r nb e f o r e1 9 6 1 ,a n df o rw h o mi ti si m p o s s i b l et oc o n s t r u c tac o m p l e t ee m p l o y m e n t
history, are dropped from the sample. The ﬁnal sample contains 158 black and 212
white High School male graduates born after December 31, 1960, who neither went
to college nor had any type of military experience. Black males were selected from
the core and from the supplemental sample, whereas white males were taken from the6
core sample. Wolpin (1992) and Rendon (2006) also use this selection of individuals
whose behavior is well described by a search-theoretic framework that excludes the
decision to join the military.
Given that blacks exhibit higher High School dropout rates and whites are more
likely to continue studying after High School, it is possible that this sample selection
leads to an underestimation of the diﬀerences in labor market outcomes by race.
As pointed out by Heckman, Lyons and Todd (2000) the deﬁnition of the sample is
crucial in making inferences about black-white diﬀerentials. In this article, the lower
tail of the income distribution of blacks and the upper tail of the income distribution
of whites could be underrepresented. In spite of this, it will be shown that wage and
wealth diﬀerences by race remain important.
To make the estimation tractable I aggregate the data into quarters. Each in-
dividual’s reported last week of school enrollment is assigned to its corresponding
calendar quarter; employment history starts in the quarter thereafter. An individual
is employed if he works twenty or more hours during the ﬁrst week of the quarter;
any other job held during the quarter is ignored. Otherwise, he is recorded as unem-
ployed for that quarter. Reasons for leaving a given employer are classed as layoﬀs
or quits. Individuals returning to work for their old employers are recorded as having
new jobs. The quarterly wage is the wage of the ﬁrst week of the quarter in 1985 dol-
lars times 13. The Consumer Price Index is used to deﬂate nominal values into real
amounts.
Annual data on the market value of wealth are only available for years 1985 until
1993, with the exception of year 1991; this information is assigned to the calendar
quarter in which the interview took place, leaving all other quarters blank.
Wealth consists of ﬁnancial assets, vehicles and other assets (like jewelry or furni-
ture), all net of debts and all computed at their “market value”, deﬁned by the NLSY
as the amount the respondent would reasonably expect someone to pay if the partic-
ular asset were sold in its current condition at any point in time. Other less liquid7
types of wealth, such as residential property and business assets, are excluded as I
assume that agents will only use the most liquid wealth to ﬁnance their job search.
Jianakoplos, Menchik and Irvine (1989), Blau and Graham (1990), and Smith (1995)
show that, as individuals of both race groups become wealthier, they increase the
proportion of their wealth in the form of residential property, business, farms or other
property, and decrease the proportion of their wealth in the form of vehicles. Notably,
at the same wealth level blacks systematically have a lower percentage of their wealth
in business property than whites, denoting a relative absence of black-owned busi-
nesses (Fairlie 1999, Fairlie and Meyer 2000). Thus, racial inequality in terms of the
most liquid wealth will be lower than racial inequality measured with total wealth.
In Rendon (2006) I estimate a similar version of this model for one race group using
total wealth.
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 shows the evolution of employment rates and transitions, wealth and
wages three, six, and nine years after High School graduation. From year 3 to year
9, the fraction of blacks who are unemployed decreases from 34% to 20%, while
the corresponding percentage for whites decreases from 18% to 9%. In the same
period, blacks increase their wealth from $1,393 to $3,702, whereas whites increase
their wealth from $4,921 to $8,780, that is, the black-white ratio of average wealth
increases from 28% to 42%. The percentage of individuals with more than $10,000
increases from 1% to 11% for blacks, and from 15% to 29% for whites. Average wage,
income of the employed, for blacks increases from $3,104 to $3,739 and from $3,363
to $4,552 for whites, meaning that the black-white ratio of average wage decreases
from 92% to 82%. It is clear that wealth accumulation does accompany the increase
in employment rates and wages that occurs after graduation from High School, and
that a reduction in the racial wealth gap is associated with a widening of the racial
wage gap.8
[Table 2 here]
Table 2 reports average wealth by wage level, number of years since graduation
and race group. Wages measure the quarterly income of the employed only; the
unemployed are not included in this table. It is shown that agents with higher wages
tend to have a higher level of wealth. No more than 6 years after graduation, blacks
with wages below $2,000 have an average wealth of $724, whereas blacks with wages
above $6,000 have an average wealth of $5,634. The corresponding wealth of whites
for the same wage brackets is, respectively, $1,396 and $8,511. These descriptive
statistics show the existence of a link between labor market progress and wealth
accumulation for both race groups.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 relates saving behavior to employment transitions between two periods for
which wealth data are available. As the interviews were conducted in diﬀerent quar-
ters for diﬀerent individuals, this time interval does not necessarily correspond to four
quarters. For both race groups becoming or staying unemployed is associated with
wealth decumulation, while becoming employed or changing employer is associated
with increases in wealth. Staying with the same employer is associated with wealth
accumulation for whites, and with wealth decumulation for blacks. Black individu-
als who are unemployed and become employed save on average $1,740 between two
quarters; the corresponding amount for whites is $365. White individuals who are
employed and become unemployed decrease their wealth in $1,515; the correspond-
ing amount for blacks is $953. Explaining these related trends requires a theoretical
model that will account jointly for wealth accumulation and employment transitions.9
3M o d e l
In this section I describe a model of wealth accumulation and job search under bor-
rowing constraints. It is an extension of Danforth’s (1979) model to allow for on-the-
job search, wage growth, variations in arrival and layoﬀ rates as a function of age,
retirement age, and a parametric borrowing limit.
An individual maximizes expected utility of consumption over his life, TF quarters.
He can be employed or unemployed during his active life, T quarters, after which
he retires and lives oﬀ his savings. Each period he faces a utility function U (·) over
consumption and, when employed, he suﬀers a constant utility loss captured by ψ ≥ 0,
which represents the disutility of working.
W h i l eu n e m p l o y e da tp e r i o dt he receives, with probability λt,o n ew a g eo ﬀer x
drawn from the known base wage oﬀer distribution F(·), x ∈ (w,w), 0 <w< w<∞.
An unemployed individual becomes employed if he receives and accepts a wage oﬀer;
otherwise he remains unemployed. Transitions from unemployment are illustrated in
the following scheme:
[Figure 1 here]
While employed at period t, an individual can be laid oﬀ with probability θt and
r e c e i v ean e ww a g eo ﬀer with probability πt,d r a w nf r o mt h es a m eb a s ed i s t r i b u t i o n
F(·). If he is not laid oﬀ and receives a job oﬀer, he can accept it and switch to a
n e wj o b ,r e j e c ti ta n ds t a yi nt h ec u r r e n tj o b ,o rr e j e c ti ta n dq u i tt ou n e m p l o y m e n t .
If he is not laid oﬀ and does not receive a job oﬀer, he has to decide between staying
in his current job or quitting to unemployment. If he is laid oﬀ, he can still receive
aj o bo ﬀer; accepting it means switching to a new job; rejecting it means becoming
unemployed. If a person is laid oﬀ a n dd o e sn o tr e c e i v ea no ﬀer, his only option is to
become unemployed. The possible transitions from being employed are shown below.10
[Figure 2 here]
When unemployed, the agent receives transfers b, which are non-labor income
such as family transfers and unemployment compensation net of search costs. When
employed, the agent experiences wage growth as a function of age, that is, his current
wage wt depends on the initial wage draw ω and age t. Similarly, both the probability
of receiving an oﬀer while unemployed and while employed, λt and πt respectively,
as well as the layoﬀ rate θt, depend on the agent’s age t. Modelling wage and arrival
rates as functions of experience would have been preferable, but would also increase
drastically the computation burden to solve and estimate this model.
At each period t, given his employment state and his wealth At, the agent deter-
mines his consumption Cu
t and Ce
t, and thereby his wealth for the next period Au
t+1
and Ae
t+1. Initial wealth is inherited and ﬁn a lw e a l t hi sz e r o . T h er a t eo fr e t u r nr
is constant; the subjective discount factor is β ∈ (0,1). Agents can save freely, but
borrowing is restricted so that current wealth cannot be lower than an age-dependent
level Bt. In a free capital market with fully risk-averse lenders individuals can borrow
up to the level they can pay back with certainty, that is, the ‘natural borrowing limit’
(Ljungqvist and Sargent 2000), which is the present discounted value of the lowest
p o s s i b l ei n c o m el e v e lb: e Bt = −
PT
τ=t b 1
(1+r)T−τ. Wealth levels below this limit imply
non-positive consumption, C = e Bt+b−e Bt+1/(1 + r)=0 , which is not admissible for
utility functions that satisfy the Inada condition limC→0 U (C)=∞. Hence, the only
non-redundant constraint is Bt > e Bt, which allows us to express and parameterize
the borrowing constraint as a fraction of the natural constraint. Let s measure the
tightness of the borrowing constraint as a fraction of e Bt, then the lower bound on
wealth is Bt = se Bt, s ∈ [0,1].
The expected lifetime utility of a retired agent of age t, V R
t , depends on wealth At:
V
R














where ATF+1 =0 . This agent saves voluntarily for retirement with full control over
his pension funds, so that the dynamic problem becomes ‘a cake-eating problem.’
A possible extension of this model is to allow for a pension system with realistic
contribution schemes during the working lifetime and pensions during retirement with
an increasing mortality. However, since the estimation will only contain a young labor
force, this extension should not aﬀect the main results substantially. Accordingly, it
is left for future research.
When unemployed, expected lifetime utility at age t, V u
t , depends on wealth At:
V
u


































When employed, expected lifetime utility at age t, V e









































































This dynamic programming (DP) problem has a ﬁnite horizon T and a ‘salvage value’
which is the present discounted utility at retirement age, that is, at t = T +1 :
V u
t (At)=V R
t (At),a n dV e
t (At,ω)=V R
t (At). The solution to this problem includes
two policy rules for wealth accumulation, Au
t+1(At) and Ae




t (At,ω)}. In this model, under certain conditions
nobody will work for a wage below b,t h a ti s :
Proposition 1 If λt+1 ≥ πt+1 and ψ ≥ 0,t h e nwt (ω∗
t(At)) ≥ b, t =1 ,...,T.12
Proof: In Appendix A1.
Notice requiring the arrival rate while unemployed to be higher than while em-
ployed is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for reservation wages to be greater
or equal than unemployment transfers. Even if this condition is not fulﬁlled, high
disutility levels associated to working can generate reservation wages that exceed
unemployment transfers.
In the absence of analytical solutions for this problem, and in order to solve it
numerically one needs to assume speciﬁc functional forms:
• a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function U(C)=C1−γ−1
1−γ ,w h e r e
γ>0 is the coeﬃcient of risk-aversion that satisﬁes the Inada conditions;
• a truncated log-normal wage oﬀer distribution lnx ∼ N(µ,σ2|lnω,lnω);
• a wage growth function wt (ω)=ωexp(α1t + α2t2);a n d
• age-dependent arrival and layoﬀ rates given by the logistic function
qt =
q0 exp(αqt)
1+q0 [exp(αqt) − 1]
,w h e r eq = {λ,π,θ}.












Then the model is solved recursively on a discretized state space. Using longer
period lengths for the more distant future value functions in the DP problem makes
the estimation more tractable (Wolpin 1992). Appendix A2 describes in detail the
discretization and the numerical solution technique.
As shown in Rendon (2006), this model produces policy rules with the following
features:
• The unemployed decumulate wealth. That is, they maintain their consumption
while searching for a job by decreasing their wealth monotonically until reaching
the borrowing limit.13
• The employed can accumulate or decumulate wealth, depending on their wages
and current wealth, so that wealth converges to some age-dependent desired
level. They keep this wealth as a precaution to cushion future unemployment
spells that may follow, if the layoﬀ rate is not zero. As retirement age approaches
they increase their wealth accumulation.
• The reservation wage is increasing in wealth. This means that wealthier agents
are more selective and end up with higher accepted wages.
These policy rules imply a close interaction between labor market turnover and
saving decisions. During unemployment spells, longer for wealthier people, reservation
wages decline and hazard rates increase. In contrast, during employment spells, and
for some combinations of current wealth and wages, wealth and reservation wage
increase. It may occur that the reservation wage exceeds the current wage, in which
case the current job is no longer preferablet ou n e m p l o y m e n t .B a r r i n gab e t t e rw a g e
oﬀer from a new employer, the agent will quit his current job to search for a better
one while unemployed with higher arrival rates. Thus, wealth accumulation underlies
quits to unemployment, which reﬂect the agent’s permanent desire to move to better
paying jobs.
As explained in Rendon (2006), quits to unemployment can only happen in this
framework if arrival rates are higher while unemployed than while employed. Al-
though this diﬀerence is not assumed in the model and is not a restriction imposed
in the estimation, observed quits will yield estimated parameters that satisfy this
diﬀerence. Notice that the incentive to quit is there in spite of age wage growth.
With these features the policy rules will be able to generate realistic employment
transitions and trajectories and distributions of wealth and wages over the life cycle.14
4 Estimation
The estimation strategy is designed to recover the behavioral parameters of the the-
oretical model. I assume that individuals start oﬀ their careers with a wealth level
drawn from a parametric initial wealth distribution and, for each parameter set, I
compute the policy rules that solve the DP problem and use them to generate simu-
lated careers paths. Then, at each iteration of the parameters I construct a measure
of distance between the observed and the simulated moments, namely the distribu-
tions of employment status and transitions, wages, and assets. The estimation is thus
a simulated method of moments (SMM) procedure in which the parameter estimates
of the theoretical model are the minimizers of this function.
All individuals start oﬀ their careers being unemployed, with a wealth level A0
drawn from a displaced lognormal distribution, ln(A0 − B0) ∼ N(µ0,σ 2
0).Ia d dt h e
lowest admissible wealth level B0 to each unobservable initial value of wealth to make
the term inside the logarithm positive. The identiﬁcation of the parameters of this
function is not only given by wealth data, which are scarce for the ﬁrst quarters after
graduation, but also, in the presence of persistence in observed wealth values over
time, by employment transitions and wages over time. The parameters to estimate
are then the following:
1. Labor Market Parameters: Θ1 = {λ0, π0, θ0, µ, σ, α1,α 2,α λ,α π,α θ}.
2. Wealth Parameters: Θ2 = {s,µ0,σ 0}.
3. Taste Parameters: Θ3 = {b,γ,ψ}.
The parameters of the standard search model, b, λ0, π0, θ0, µ,a n dσ, extended by
α1,α 2,α λ,α π, αθ,a n dψ are identiﬁed from the reservation wage rule by the observed
transitions, accepted wages, and wealth level at each quarter after graduation . The
interest rate r and the discount factor β are not identiﬁed separately from the arrival
rates, so they are ﬁxed at 0.015 and 0.98, respectively. The other parameters, namely15
γ and s are speciﬁc of a utility-maximizing job search model, which generates rules
for wealth accumulation, and are pinned down by the observed evolution of wealth
by employment status and wages.
Individuals do not only diﬀer in their initial wealth, but also in other char-
acteristics that have permanent eﬀects in their work history. Assuming there is
only one type of agent would, therefore, lead to making wrong inferences, in par-
ticular with regards to the estimation of wage oﬀer distributions and arrival rates
(Lazear 1979, Orazem 1987). To prevent this I introduce unobserved heterogeneity
in the estimation and assume eight types of agents within each race group, which
requires solving the DP problem eight times, one for each type of agent.
I assume two types for each of the three subsets of parameters, indexed by 1 and
2. Therefore, there are 8=2 3 types of individuals characterized by each possible
combination of the three subsets: Θijk = {Θ1
i, Θ2
j, Θ3
k}, i,j,k =1 ,2. The proportion






k pijk =1 .







2, p111, p112, p121, p122, p211, p212, p221} and contains the two types of
the three subsets of parameters and only seven proportions.
I generate simulated career paths for 8000 individuals, that is, 1000 draws for
each type of agent in each subsample. The moments used in this estimation are the
cell-by-cell probability masses for the following distributions:
1. wealth distribution (10 years × 5 moments),
2. wage distribution (10 years × 4 moments),
3. employment status (10 years × 2 moments),
4. employment transitions from unemployment (10 years × 2 moments),
5. employment transitions from employment (10 years × 3 moments),
6. layoﬀs from employment to unemployment (10 years × 2m o m e n t s ) ,a n d
7. layoﬀs when changing employer (10 years × 2m o m e n t s ) .16
Thus, there are 200 moments to estimate 32 parameters, 16 for each type of
agent plus 7 proportions of types for each race group. These simulated moments are
computed for each year and without excluding actually missing observations (these
moments barely change when they are computed excluding simulated individual and
quarterly observations when the observed counterpart is missing). The SMM proce-





where ∆m is the distance between each sample and simulated moment and W is a
weighting matrix. As shown in Appendix A3, the matrix W can be chosen so that
this weighted distance equals the sum of the χ2-statistics of the selected distributions.
In that case, minimizing this function is equivalent to minimizing a goodness of ﬁt
measure: ∆m0W−1∆m = χ2
130. Hence, ﬁt measured by this criterion is the best that
can be attained. The estimated behavioral parameters are thus Θ∗ =a r gm i nS (Θ).
The function is minimized using Powell’s method (Press, Teutolsky, Vetterling and
Flannery 1992), which requires only function evaluations, not derivatives. This algo-
rithm ﬁrst calculates function values for the whole parameter space and then searches
for the optimal parameter direction in the next iteration for function minimization.
Underlying the computation of this optimal direction there is an implicit model of
the derivative structure of the objective function. Once a new set of parameters is ob-
tained, the algorithm goes back to calculate a new function value ft, and the process
is repeated until a convergence criterion is satisﬁed, namely that the percentage varia-
tion of this value falls below a certain value: 2
|ft−ft−1|
|ft|+|ft−1| ≤ 10−10. Asymptotic standard
errors are calculated using the outer-product gradient estimator; their computation
is explained in greater detail in Appendix A4.17
5 Estimation Results
In this section, I discuss the parameter estimates for the two race groups and compare
graphically and numerically actual and ﬁtted moments: hazard rates at the ﬁrst
unemployment spell, trajectories for all observed variables and wealth variations by
employment transitions.
The parameter estimates by race and type and their corresponding asymptotic
standard errors are reported in Table 4.
[Table 4 here]
The ﬁrst set of parameters, which characterize the labor market environment, are
reported in the upper part of the table. The probabilities of receiving an oﬀer while
unemployed are initially lower but grow faster for blacks than for whites. In the
ﬁrst period out of school these are 55% for Type 1 and 30% for Type 2 of blacks.
However, forty quarters after graduation they have grown substantially to 73% and
98% respectively. For whites these probabilities are initially 84% for Type 1 and 58%
for Type 2; forty quarters later they have not grown much: 99% and 68%, respectively.
On the other hand, the probability of receiving an oﬀer while employed is higher
for blacks than for whites: it is initially 17% for Type 1 and 78% for Type 2 of
blacks and 10% for Type 1 and 53% for Type 2 of whites. For both race groups
these probabilities do not grow much with age: forty quarters after graduation they
become 23% and 79% for blacks and 28% and 55% for whites. The relatively slow
growth of oﬀer rates while employed in contrast to the fast growth of oﬀer rates
while unemployed, captures the observed trend of decreasing job-to-job transitions
over time that is simultaneous to exit rates from unemployment remaining pretty
constant. To match increasing reservation wages, a result of wealth accumulation,
arrival rates while unemployed have to go up so that exit rates remain more or less
constant. Similarly, if agents are becoming more selective in their job acceptance18
decisions and are moving up to better paying jobs, matching observed decreasing
job-to-job transitions requires oﬀer rates while employed not grow too fast.
Finally, the layoﬀ rate is initially higher but decreases faster for blacks. While it is
22% for Type 1 and 17% for Type 2 of blacks, it is 7% for Type 1 and 13% for Type 2
of whites. Forty quarters after graduation these parameters become, respectively, 3%
and 9% for blacks and 5% and 3% for whites, which means that there is relatively fast
convergence in layoﬀ rates. Only for blacks of Type 2 these arrival and layoﬀ rates,
both the initial values and the associated variation parameters, are not statistically
signiﬁcant; for all other groups they are estimated with small standard errors.
Blacks exhibit lower means but higher standard deviations of the log-wage oﬀer
distributions than whites. These parameters imply an estimated initial mean quar-
terly wage oﬀer for Type 1 and Type 2 of $1,964 and $1,590 for blacks and $1,575 and
$2,511 for whites, respectively. Wages grow at a declining rate for both races, but
they grow higher for whites, who also reach a maximum level later in their working
life: at 264.3 and 29.9 quarters for Type 1 and Type 2, respectively, of whites. The
equivalent for blacks is 94.6 and 19.1 quarters. The highest attainable mean wage
oﬀers are $2,759 for Type 1 and $1,785 for Type 2 of blacks, and $3,457 for Type 1
and $3,051 for Type 2 of whites. Asymptotic standard errors for these parameters are
in general small, with the exception of the quadratic term of wage growth for Type 2
of blacks, which is found to be non-signiﬁcant.
While these implications are useful in providing a ﬁrst glance on the evolution
of wages, they do not consider wealth-dependent labor turnover (agents switching
jobs and employment states depending on their wealth position) and therefore do not
imply that wages for a given individual wages will peak at the above age. Simulation
of the model over the individuals’ life cycle yields wages that peak at $7,838 for
blacks and $9,132 for whites. The interested reader will ﬁnd further insights on the
maximum attainable wages over an individual’s life cycle in Appendix A5.
These parameters are characteristic of the standard search model and represent19
a labor market environment that is more favorable for whites than for blacks. As in
Wolpin (1992), whites have a better wage oﬀer distribution and more wage growth.
However, here the diﬀerences in arrival rates are much larger for both race groups:
arrival rates while unemployed are higher, arrival rates while employed are lower,
and layoﬀ rates are higher. Accounting for the evolution of wealth and the reason
for leaving the current employer, particularly voluntary quits from employment to
unemployment, require larger diﬀerences between arrival rates by employment status
and larger layoﬀ rates.
The second set of parameters are speciﬁc of a utility-maximizing search model:
the tightness of the borrowing constraint and the parameters characterizing the initial
wealth distribution. Borrowing constraints are tight for both race groups, especially
for both types of blacks. The parameter s capturing the tightness of the borrowing
constraints is 0.4% and 1.3% for Type 1 and Type 2 of blacks and almost the same for
the two types of whites: 4.85% and 4.90%. Their standard errors are small, except
for Type 2 of whites.
The means and standard deviations of the displaced log-wealth distribution are
higher for whites than for blacks. However, standard deviations are consistently
non-signiﬁcant. Notice that this distribution is identiﬁed mainly from initial wealth
observations that start only in 1985. A larger number of early observations would
certainly yield a more precise estimation of these parameter.
Whereas initial average wealth of blacks is between -$549 and $0 for Type 1 and
between $5,216 and $5,765 for Type 2, for whites it is $8,467 for Type 1 and between
$16,520 and $16,937 for Type 2. There is no unique initial average wealth level,
because the support of the initial wealth distribution depends also on the amount of
transfers while unemployed.
The third set of parameters reveals that blacks tend to have more transfers while
unemployed, less risk-aversion, and more disutility of working than whites. Transfers
while unemployed for Type 1 and Type 2 are respectively $1,049 and $389 for blacks20
and $515 and $326 for whites. The estimated coeﬃcient of risk-aversion γ is 1.08
and 0.26 for Type 1 and Type 2 of blacks, respectively, and accounts for lower saving
rates. It is 1.07 and 1.31 for Type I and 2 of whites. The disutility of working is
0.20 and 0.86 for blacks and 0.11 and 0.21 for whites. Together with transfers while
unemployed, this parameter is pinned down by the higher unemployment rates and
lower exit rates from unemployment of blacks. All these parameters exhibit small
standard errors, with the exception of the disutility of working of Type 2 of blacks
and transfers of Type 2 of whites.
These parameter estimates are similar to those of Rendon (2006) despite the diﬀer-
ences in the model speciﬁcation and the estimation method. In Rendon (2006) wage
growth depends on speciﬁc human capital accumulation, not age, and the estimation
method of choice is maximum likelihood. The most notable diﬀerences in parameter
estimates are for borrowing constraints and the coeﬃcient of risk aversion, respec-
tively tighter and higher in that article, which may stem from using liquid wealth
rather than total wealth here.
These subsets of parameters produce only ﬁve types of black agents and six types
of white agents. However, three of these types alone represent 91% of blacks and 92%
of whites while some of the remaining types are estimated to have zero proportion in
their respective sample. Minority types exhibit also high standard errors and may,
therefore, not be representative in their own sample. For a better understanding of
these types I also report unemployment rates, average quarterly wages, and wealth
by race group and type for years 3, 6, and 9 in Table 5.
[Table 5 here]
Type p111 is the largest for both race groups: 44% of blacks and 39% of whites
belong to this type. For both race groups this type faces a labor market environ-
ment that is comparable to previous estimates (see Wolpin 1992 and Rendon 2006),21
with higher arrival rates while unemployed, and relatively low layoﬀ rates. These
parameters generate reservation wages that are increasing in wealth.
Type p121 of blacks represent 26% of its group, the second largest. It exhibits
the same relatively favorable labor market environment than the previous type, with
a l m o s tt h es a m ew a g ep a t h ,t h es a m eh i g ht r a n s f e r s ,h i g hr i s ka v e r s i o n ,a n dl o w
disutility of working parameters, but higher initial wealth and more access to credit.
As shown in Table 5, looser borrowing constraints imply less wealth at later periods for
this type, despite being initially wealthier. On the contrary, Type p212, representing
21% of blacks, faces a labor environment in which it is hard to receive a job oﬀer when
unemployed, and easy to receive a job oﬀer and get ﬁred while employed. Accordingly,
reservation wages do not depend on wealth. In this labor market environment, the
unemployment rate is very low, less than 3% over the sample period. This type is also
characterized by low initial wealth, high disutility of working and low risk-aversion,
therefore it exhibits low savings and stagnated wealth levels. Type p212 and Type p221
are altogether 28% of blacks and both face a depressed labor market, with Type p221
being the wealthier segment of this subset.
In turn, the second and third largest types among whites, Type p221,3 1 % ,a n d
Type p211, 21%, share the same taste parameters with Type p111, implying higher sav-
ings than blacks, medium transfers while unemployed, and low disutility of working.
They also receive better wage oﬀers than Type p111; however, since their initial arrival
rates while unemployed and employed do not diﬀer much, Type p221 and Type p211
are characterized by a reservation wage that initially does not depend on the agent’s
wealth position. In later periods, as the arrival rate while unemployed increases and
the arrival rate while employed remains about the same, the reservation wage becomes
increasing in wealth. Otherwise, the only diﬀerence between them is that Type p221
is wealthier than Type p211.I nt h a ts e n s e ,p111, p112,a n dp122, the segment with the
depressed labor market, relatively high unemployment, no more than $3,600 quarterly
wages at year 9, and decreasing wealth levels over time, amounts to 44% of the sample22
of whites. This segment is larger and enjoys a better labor market environment than
the corresponding segment of blacks.
6M o d e l F i t
To assess how well these parameter estimates mimic the data, I compare the observed
and the predicted choice distributions of employment status, employment transitions,
wealth, and wages.
[Figure 3 and Figure 4 here]
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the actual and the predicted hazard rates for the ﬁrst
unemployment spell. For both groups, the model is able to replicate the data closely,
especially for whites for whom the predicted hazard rate mimics closely the actual
hazard rate and its negative duration dependence. However, for blacks the predicted
hazard rate does not exhibit a the pronounced negative duration dependence of its
observed counterpart. This may be related to the increase in the observed hazard
rate of blacks from quarter 11 until 13. A similar increase, though less abrupt, is also
present in the hazard rate of whites from quarter 8 until 13. Since the initial wealth
distribution and heterogeneity play a crucial role for reproducing this pattern, the
few early wealth observations used in the estimation may be the reason the model
does not reproduce closely the negative duration dependence of blacks. Conditional
on initial wealth level and type, hazard rates are increasing over time: individuals
reduce their wealth position while unemployed, so that reservation wages decline and
hazard rates increase. However, because poorer individuals exhibit high hazard rates
and are ﬁrst to exit unemployment, the predicted average hazard rate tends to go
down over time. Considering also that the observed hazard rates were not used in the
estimation, this comparison can be considered a cross validation, an out-of-sample
assessment of the model’s success in ﬁtting the data.23
[Figure 5 here]
[Table 6 here]
Figure 5 oﬀers a graphical comparison of all actual and predicted variables by
quarter since graduation for both race groups. Additionally, Table 6 presents a sum-
mary of the actual and predicted distributions of employment status and transitions
for years 3, 6, and 9 after graduation for both race groups. It also shows goodness of
ﬁt tests to evaluate whether the theoretical model at the estimated parameters can
mimic the cell-by-cell distribution of the data. The test statistic across choices j at




ˆ njt ,w h e r enjt is the actual number of observations
of choice j at time t, ˆ njt is the model predicted counterpart, J is the total number
of possible choices and T is the number of years. This statistic has an asymptotic χ2
distribution with J − 1 degrees of freedom.
In the graphical comparison, the evolution of predicted employment status and
employment transitions replicate the actual paths for both race groups very accu-
rately: unemployment rates in Figures 5a and 5b, transitions from unemployment
to employment shown in Figures 5c and 5d, job separations reported in Figures 5e
and 5f, and job-to-job transitions, in Figures 5g and 5h. Exits from unemployment
and job-to-job transitions are particularly noisy. The χ2 statistics corroborate this
graphical evidence and show that prediction is accurate for both race groups: all of
these variables pass the χ2 tests.
As illustrated by Figures 5i-5l the model overpredicts slightly the percentage of
layoﬀs in job separations, but predicts very accurately the percentage of layoﬀsi nj o b -
to-job transitions. Yet, at the formal level, the choice distributions of these transitions
pass the χ2 tests.
[Table 7 here]24
Table 7 presents a similar summary of the actual and predicted wealth and wage
distributions, including goodness of ﬁt tests. The corresponding evolution of wealth is
illustrated graphically in Figures 5m and 5n. In spite of the noise in the wealth data,
the model mimics well the observed pattern of wealth accumulation. As implied by the
initially decreasing hazard rate seen above, just after graduation whites decumulate
wealth in order to ﬁnance their ﬁrst unemployment spell, but then they accumulate
wealth as a result of making progress in their employment careers. Blacks also show
initial wealth decumulation, but it is not as pronounced as for whites. The model
passes the χ2 tests for both race groups at all years. Notice that the actual wealth
of whites is more noisy than that of blacks. Nevertheless, the model reproduces
relatively well the racial wealth ratio at the average, particularly at years 6 and 9,
and its ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing trend over time
As explained above, for most individuals in the sample initial wealth is not ob-
served, as it is only observed from 1985 onwards. This implies that conditioning on
initial wealth in simulating the data for the goodness of ﬁt tests is not feasible. Had
such data been available, I could certainly have shown a better model ﬁt.
Figures 5o and 5p show that wages are especially well replicated on average, with
some overprediction for blacks and some underprediction for whites in later periods.
The model also mimics well the observed wage distribution: it passes the χ2 tests for
both race groups in all years, with the exception of whites in year 9. The racial wage
ratio and its declining trend over time are partially captured by the model, at year 3
and year 6.
[Table 8 here]
T a b l e8s h o w st h ea c t u a la n dp r e d i c t e dﬁr s tu n e m p l o y m e n ts p e l ld u r a t i o na n d
ﬁrst accepted wage. It is shown that the model is able to replicate these two vari-
ables pretty well, though with some underprediction of the unemployment duration25
of blacks and some overprediction of the ﬁrst accepted wage of whites. This table
also provides a comparison between observed and predicted savings by employment
transitions as reported previously in Table 3. Comparing these predicted moments
with their observed counterparts, as the hazard rates, is informative about the ability
of the model to replicate observables that have not been used in the estimation. This
table reveals a relatively good prediction of savings during job separations for both
race groups, exits from unemployment and employment retention for whites, and
job-to-job transitions for blacks. Other wealth variations by employment transitions
are under- or overestimated. By contrast, the employment transitions themselves are
very accurately predicted by the model.
In short, both graphically and formally the model is fairly successful in replicating
the main features of the data.
7 Regime Changes
After recovering the underlying behavioral parameters, I explore black-white varia-
tions in outcomes resulting from changes in the economic environment in the three
subsets of parameters: ﬁrst, assigning blacks the labor market conditions of whites,
second, the initial wealth distribution and access to credit of whites, and, third, the
taste parameters of whites. Additionally, I evaluate the outcomes of performing two
of these changes at a time. Notice that there are several combinations for computing
these counterfactuals. For example, one can replace a parameter subset of Types 1
and 2 of blacks respectively by the corresponding parameter subset of Types 1 and 2
of whites or, alternatively, of Types 2 and 1. For simplicity, I only report the coun-
terfactual that yields the highest welfare for blacks. The eﬀects of these experiments,
of which labor and wealth changes are welfare-improving, are reported in Table 9,
where the ﬁrst and last columns show selected predicted variables for the black and
white subsample, respectively. Once again, average wages only contain the income of26
the employed.
[Table 9 here]
The ﬁrst experiment, reported in column 2, addresses the importance of labor
market conditions, that is, of the ﬁrst subset of parameters in blacks’ outcomes.
While at the beginning of the employment careers this experiment decreases the
racial wealth gap very slightly, it practically eliminates the racial wage gap; in the
fourth quarter, however, whereas the black-white wealth ratio goes down from 20%
to 16%, the black-white wage ratio increases from 89% to 109%. As agents rely more
on good labor market conditions, they can initially decumulate faster to ﬁnance their
job search. These conditions also imply transitions that are very similar to whites
and, therefore, the same unemployment rate. In the long run, the better labor market
conditions prevail and wealth increases with wages: forty quarters after graduation
the racial wealth ratio has increased from 37% to 86% and the racial wage ratio from
94% to 109%.
As shown in column 3, having whites’ initial wealth distribution and access to
credit increases blacks’ average wealth and wages in the fourth quarter after gradua-
tion, smoothing out racial diﬀerences almost completely: the racial wealth and wage
ratio increase to 96% and 93%, respectively. It also improves blacks’ welfare consider-
ably, basically by increasing their consumption in the ﬁrst quarters after graduation.
On the other hand, more initial wealth leads to a longer initial unemployment spell
and higher rates of unemployment at the start of employment careers, deteriorating
blacks’ employment situation. None of these changes, however, is persistent: forty
quarters after graduation racial disparities reemerge: while blacks’ wages remain un-
changed, at 94% of whites’, the racial wealth ratio diminishes from 37% to 28%.
Broader access to credit, unlike the displacement of initial wealth, is a permanent
change and undermines the need for holding wealth.27
The outcomes for blacks when they are assigned the taste parameters of whites
are presented in column 4. With more risk-aversion, less disutility of working, and
less transfers while unemployed blacks become less selective in their job search and
suﬀer an initial decline in accepted wages, from 89% to 83% of whites’ wages, and
the unemployment rate, from 43% to 36%. Wealth, however, increases slightly from
20% to 28% of whites’. Lower wages and more wealth holdings imply a substantial
reduction in consumption, from $1,783 to $1,495, the lowest attained by any exper-
iment. Forty quarters after graduation, blacks have accumulated wealth relatively
fast, increasing the black-white wealth ratio from 37% to 59%, wages recover from
their initial decline, and the unemployment rate increases from 16% to 20%.
The second set of experiments starts in column 5, combining two changes at a
time. This column illustrates the results of extending the ﬁr s te x p e r i m e n tb ya l s o
assigning blacks the initial wealth distribution and borrowing possibilities of whites.
This variation increases blacks’ welfare and consumption the most, plus having the
initial eﬀect of diminishing both the wealth and the wage gap: in the fourth quar-
ter after graduation relative wealth of blacks increases from 20% to 60% of whites’
and relative wages go up from 89% to 99%. However, the improved labor market
conditions combined with looser borrowing constraints, both permanent changes, un-
dermine the need of precautionary savings, so that forty quarters after graduation
wealth goes down and the racial wealth ratio diminishes from 37% to 1%. At the
same time, the wage gap disappears fully and unemployment rates fall below those of
whites. Consumption is the highest and the saving rate while employed is the lowest
of all experiments. Forty quarters after graduation blacks’ average consumption has
increased from $3,390 to $3,926, overtaking whites’, at $3,518.
Had blacks the labor and taste parameters of whites, as reported in column 6, they
would experience a modest increase in their initial wealth: the racial wealth ratio rises
from 20% to 32%. In this scenario, blacks’ ﬁrst unemployment spell is shorter, their
exit rates from unemployment higher, their unemployment rate lower, and their wages28
higher, almost the same as whites. However, in the fortieth quarter after graduation
this experiment has created full long run racial convergence in wealth and wages: all
wage and wealth gaps have disappeared. Given that borrowing constraints are the
only remaining permanent diﬀerence with whites and that these are relatively tight
and quite similar across race groups, this combined change is the most successful
in eliminating wealth and wage racial diﬀerences in the long run, matching thereby
the welfare level of blacks and whites. Additionally, this experiment generates both
faster wealth accumulation while employed and faster wealth decumulation while
unemployed.
The combination of better initial wealth distributions, looser borrowing con-
straints, and the taste parameters of whites, reported in column 7, does a better job
of eliminating initial wealth racial diﬀerences, even more than only switching initial
wealth distributions and accessibility to credit. Furthermore, the wealth black-white
ratio forty quarters after graduation increases from 37% to 60%. However, this exper-
i m e n th a st h ee ﬀect of reducing the relative wage of blacks, initially from 89% to 81%
a n di nt h el o n gr u nf r o m9 4 %t o8 2 % .U n l i k et h es e c o n de x p e r i m e n t ,i nw h i c ho n l y
initial wealth distributions and access to credit are increased, the current experiment
also reduces de disutility of working and transfers while unemployed, which results in
lower reservation wages and, therefore, lower accepted wages. The increase in risk-
aversion, which has the eﬀect of increasing reservation wages, does not seem enough
to counteract this trend. Consequently, blacks do not only have lower wages, but
also, and similarly to whites, lower unemployment rates and employment transitions.
Another variable of interest in these experiments is the saving rate. Compared to
blacks, whites save more when employed and dissave more when unemployed. Blacks’
savings rates in the long run converge to those of whites only when blacks are assigned
the taste parameters of whites.
Summarizing, improving the initial wealth distribution and access to credit of
blacks is the only regime change that eliminates both racial wealth and wage gaps29
at the beginning of employment careers. This change, however, fails to substantially
diminish the long run racial wealth and wage gaps. On the other hand, only improv-
ing labor market conditions of blacks accomplishes initial and long run convergence
of labor market outcomes, that is, of wages, unemployment rates and employment
transitions. If this improvement is combined with a switch in preferences, it also
eliminates long run, but not initial wealth disparity.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
The main purpose of this paper has been to determine the extent to which initial
wealth disparity is responsible for the observed diﬀerences in early employment ca-
reers of black and white individuals. I generalize Danforth’s (1979) utility-maximizing
search model to allow for on-the-job search, wage growth, arrival and layoﬀ rate vari-
ations, retirement, and a parametric borrowing limit, and estimate it by a simulated
method of moments using data from the NLSY. At the recovered behavioral parame-
ters, the model mimics well the main observables, namely, the hazard rate during the
ﬁrst unemployment spell, ﬁrst accepted wages, savings by employment transitions,
and the cross-sectional distributions of wealth, wages, and employment transitions
over time.
Counterfactual experiments reveal that most of the diﬀerences in labor market
performance between blacks and whites several years after High School graduation
are accounted for by diﬀerences in their wage oﬀer distributions and arrival and layoﬀ
rates, both in levels and growth, as well as preferences. Diﬀerences in initial wealth
have essentially no role in explaining racial disparities several years after High School
graduation; they are able to account for the racial gap both in wealth and wages only
at the beginning of employment careers.
These results are revealing about racial diﬀerences in labor market outcomes stem-
ming from initial wealth, the labor market environment, and preferences. Throughout30
this paper, I have abstracted from racial diﬀerences arising from schooling choices,
which also provide insurance for labor risk (Whalley 2005), and general equilibrium
eﬀects, that is, regime changes can also aﬀe c tw a g eo ﬀer distributions and arrival
rates. The utility-maximizing job search model proposed here can be extended in
these two directions, which may alter the eﬀects of regime changes implemented in
this paper. Recent papers by Lee (2005) and Lee and Wolpin (2006) account for
schooling decisions in a general equilibrium setting and are thus encouraging about
the feasibility of these extensions in future research.31
Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
I proceed inductively, showing wt+1 (ω) ≥ b implies wt (ω) ≥ b,f o rt<T . Suppose that
wt+1 (ω) ≥ b and wt (ω)=b,f o rt<T, then the value functions become:
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t (AT) ≥ V e
t (At,b),i fλt+1 ≥ πt+1 and ψ ≥ 0,s ot h a tV e
T(AT,ω)=V u
T (AT) only
when wT (ω) ≥ b.
Now suppose that at period T, wT (ω)=b,t h e ni fψ ≥ 0:
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T (AT) ≥ V e
T(AT,b),i fψ ≥ 0,s ot h a tV e
T(AT,ω)=V u
T (AT) only when wT (ω) ≥ b.¥
A2. Numerical Solution of the Model
As mentioned in the main body of the paper, the model is solved on a discretized state space.
Certainly, the computation of the DP problem and the criterion function are sensitive to
the discretization of the state and choice variables, especially of wealth. Few gridpoints for
wealth reduce the accuracy of the model in replicating observed quits and savings, and in
estimating the borrowing limit. The choice of 201 gridpoints for wealth, almost four times
as much as the number of gridpoints for wages, aims to ameliorate this problem. Fewer
than 5% of wealth and 3% of wage observations lie outside the admissible range deﬁned by





Discretized Variable A(i) ω(j)
Gridpoints i =1 ,...,N A j =1 ,...,N w
Number of Gridpoints NA = 201 Nw =5 1
Lower Bound A = −10,250 w =1 ,000
Upper Bound A =5 5 ,250 w =1 0 ,000
Gridsize ∆A =
A−A
NA ∆w = lnw−lnw
Nw32






























The entire working lifetime is assumed to be 162 quarters. As in Wolpin (1992), the
solution to the model and estimation is made tractable assuming that the individual solves
the DP problem using longer period lengths for the more distant future value functions.
Let n b et h ep e r i o dl e n g t hm e a s u r e di nq u a r t e r sa n dl e ttn b ea g em e a s u r e di np e r i o d so f
varying length n. The following scheme illustrates the periods’ transformation:
50 quarterly periods 8 annual periods 10 biannual periods
Quarters t: 1, 2„......, 49, 50 51, 52,...., 81, 82 83, 84,......, 161, 162
Period Length: n =1 n =4 n =8
Transformed periods tn 1, 2,......, 49, 50 51, 52,...., 57, 58 59, 60,......, 67, 68
Then, the age in quarters measured in periods of varying length n = {1,4,8} is
t(tn)=m i n( tn,50) + 4min(max(tn − 50,0),58) + 8max(tn − 58,0).
Notice that the transformed number of periods tn does not indicate the number of quarterly,
annual, biannual periods. This way, a ﬁnite horizon DP problem of originally 162 quarterly
periods is transformed into a problem of only T =6 8periods. However, one has to make
several adjustments in the setup to match these varying period lengths.
The arrival and discount rates for a person of age tn measured in periods of length n
are, thus,
qn (tn)=1− (1 − q(t))n, q = {λ,π,θ},β n = βn.
And the borrowing constraint is just Btn = −s
PT
τ=t(tn) b/(1 + r)T−τ. For annual and
biannual period lengths, the quarterly consumption is assumed to be constant during that
period. If the agent is unemployed and consumes Cu in each quarter, wealth at the end of
ap e r i o do fl e n g t hn is
Atn+1 =( 1+r)





































Consumption is also constant during the period when the individual is employed, without
any change in the wage oﬀer distribution, but with an adjustment for wage growth. The






Hence, the utility function for a period of length n from a constant quarterly consump-

















This way, the DP problem is solved by choosing wealth next period regardless of the period
length, just by making the necessary adjustments in the utility function and its arguments
during the backward solution. Note that this procedure does not entail aggregating quar-
terly observations, because the estimation only uses data from period 1 until period 40, for
which I use quarterly periods.
The numerical solution proceeds in the following steps:
1. For tn = T +1deﬁne the discretized value functions:
b V u [i,tn]=VR (A(i)), and
b V e [i,j,tn]=VR (A(i)),
where VR (A(i)) is the discretized value of being retired. For a CRRA utility function,
this value function admits an analytical expression:
V R




































1−β ,a n dATF+1 > 0.















, respectively. With β (1 + r) < 1, consumption and
assets of the retired decrease monotonically over time. Individuals are assumed to
live for 25 years (100 quarters) after retirement. As the value function and the policy
rules for retirement admit closed solutions and these functions are only needed at the
moment of retirement, their period length is a quarter.34






b V e [i,j,tn], b V u [i,tn]
i
f(j)+[ 1− λn (tn)] b V u [i,tn];





















b V e [i,l,tn], b V u [i,tn]
i
f(l)+[ 1− πn (tn)])b V u [i,tn]
!
.
3. Compute the value function for the previous period










+ βnWu [m,tn +1 ]
¾
,










+ βnWe [q,j,tn +1 ]
¾
,
where A(i∗ (tn +1 ) )=Btn+1. The maximizers to these problems are q∗ = q∗ (i,j,tn)
and m∗ = m∗ (i,tn); the reservation wage is j∗ (i,tn)=
n
j
¯ ¯ ¯b V e [i,j,tn] ≥ b V u [i,tn] > b V e [i,j − 1,t n]
o
.
4. Go to step 2. This process goes backwards and it is repeated until reaching period
tn =1 .
A3. Simulated Method of Moments
The discrete distribution of an observed variable is characterized by a set of J frequencies
mj, j = {1,..,J}.L e t n be the total number of observations of the actual variable and
nj the number of observations of the actual variable in the jth cell. The predicted coun-
terparts of the frequencies and the number of observations for the jth cell are b mj and ˆ nj,
respectively. Let ∆m0 =[ ∆m1,···,∆mJ]
0 be a vector in which ∆mj = mj − b mj,t h a ti s ,
the diﬀerence between the actual and the predicted percentage for each cell. A method
of moments estimation minimizes the weighted average distance between the actual and
predicted distributions ∆m0W−1∆m,w h e r eW is a diagonal matrix in which each element
of the main diagonal is
e mj























Since a sum of chi-square random variables follows also a chi-square distribution, with this




Jk−1,w h e r e
L =
PK
k=1 Jk = 200 is the number of moments used in the estimation, and K =7 0(7
variables ×10 years). Hence, matching the simulated moments to the moments observed in35
the actual dataset is equivalent to computing a χ2-statistic for the selected distributions:
S (Θ)=χ2
L−K.
A4. Asymptotic Standard Errors












The ﬁrst numerical derivative is computed by increasing each parameter proportionally by
h and smoothing the criterion function, which has many discontinuities, with a quadratic
approximation. If a ﬁrst approximation of the ﬁrst derivative is
S(Θ+hΘ)−S(Θ)
hΘ ,t h er e l a t i v e
step-size in each parameter can be further shrinked by ε ∈ (0,1).L e tS (θ + εhθ)−S (θ) ≈










θ . Alternatively, other methods can be used, such as a kernel
approximations for smoothing the computation of these derivatives as in Coppejans and
Sieg (2005).
The second derivative is approximated in a similar way, that is, by computing the
implied variation in the numerical ﬁrst derivative implied by a variation of each parameter















,i f i = j.
where S (Θ−i,θi + hθi) is the criterion function when parameter θi is increased by hθi and
all the other parameters denoted by Θ−i are unchanged, and S (Θ−i,j,θi + hθi,θj + hθj) is
the criterion function when parameters θi and θj are increased respectively by hθi and hθj
and all of the others, Θ−i,j,a r ek e p tﬁxed.
The parameters’ asymptotic standard errors are the square root of the main diagonal
of this matrix. I use h =0 .01 for the behavioral parameters, and h =0 .0001 for the
proportions of types.36
A5. Wage Peaks by Type
The following table indicates at which quarter wages of each race group reach their maximum
level
Maximum Wage by Race, Type and Quarter
Blacks Whites
Wage Peak Wage Peak
Types % Value Quarter Types % Value Quarter
p111 43.59 7838 41 p111 39.33 9132 162
p112 0.16 7644 143
p121 26.33 7019 126
p122 1.71 6961 125 p122 4.95 7661 144
p211 21.38 5270 41
p212 21.21 2570 70 p212 3.22 5749 33
p221 7.16 2950 65 p221 30.96 5272 41
Generally speaking, wages of blacks tend to peak earlier and at lower values than wages
of whites. Type p111 attains the highest wages if both race groups: $7,838 quarterly wages at
quarter 41 for blacks and $9,132 at quarter 162 for whites. It is noteworthy that Type p111
of whites, which exhibits relatively low wage levels during the sample period, is the type
with the highest maximum wage level. In general, individuals belonging to Type 2 of labor
market parameters, p211, p212,a n dp221, have lower initial wages with relatively slow but
very persistent wage growth and therefore lower average wages than their corresponding
Type 1 individuals. On the contrary, blacks’ Type 2 of labor market parameters, p212 and
p221, exhibit lower average wages than Type 1, that is, for this group there is no overtaking
in wages.37
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Table 1: Unemployment, Wealth and Wages by Number of Years since Graduation.
Black and White Male High School Graduates (amounts in 1985 dollars)
In small fonts: Number of observations
Blacks Whites
Variable Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 Year 3 Year 6 Year 9
Employment status and transitions
% Unemployed 34.2 19.3 19.7 18.3 10.9 8.8
Observations 622 592 569 845 832 804
%U n e m p l o y e d
becoming Employed 24.9 22.8 33.0 37.4 45.1 47.9
%E m p l o y e d
becoming Unemployed 12.2 5.9 8.3 8.4 6.5 5.6
changing Employer 9.5 8.2 7.4 11.4 8.5 5.2
% Employed Quitting
to Unemployment 31.1 53.9 47.2 30.6 43.2 37.9
Observations 45 26 36 49 37 29
to Employment 47.2 72.2 58.6 65.7 80.0 66.7
Observations 36 36 29 67 55 33
Wealth
Average 1393 3381 3702 4921 5664 8780
Black-White Ratio (%) 28 60 42
%w i t h
A ≤ 0 2.8 5.7 6.2 7.8 13.8 10.7
0 <A≤ 10,000 95.8 86.8 83.2 76.6 68.8 60.0
10,000 <A≤ 20,000 0.0 4.7 6.2 10.9 10.9 12.1
20,000 <A≤ 30,000 1.4 0.9 2.7 3.1 2.2 10.7
A>30,000 0.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 4.4 6.4
Observations 71 106 113 64 138 140
Wages
Average Quarterly Wage 3104 3473 3739 3363 4114 4552
Black-White Ratio (%) 92 84 82
%w i t h
w ≤ 2,000 20.2 12.7 10.9 16.7 8.5 4.6
2,000 <w≤ 4,000 61.3 60.7 56.1 58.2 50.7 38.2
4,000 <w≤ 6,000 16.2 19.1 21.6 18.6 27.7 40.7
w>6,000 2.3 7.5 11.4 6.5 13.2 16.5
Observations 346 440 412 598 651 668
Note: Wages are only the labor income of the employed and do not include any income of the
unemployed.41
Table 2: Average Wealth by Wages and Years after Graduation (in 1985 dollars)
In small fonts: Number of observations
Blacks Whites
Wages Years ≤ 6 Years > 6 Years ≤ 6 Years > 6
w ≤ 2,000 724 1674 1396 2338
38 38 48 27
2,000 <w≤ 4,000 1762 2361 4056 6049
177 202 193 208
4,000 <w≤ 6,000 4528 6108 6227 8747
53 76 94 168
w>6,000 5634 9377 8511 11283
73 0 3 4 5 2
Note: This table only contains observations for employed individuals. Wages are only
labor income.
Table 3: Average Quarterly Savings by Employment Transitions:
Blacks’ savings/Whites’ savings. In small fonts: No. of blacks / No. of whites
Employment t + ∆
Status Un- Same New Total
t employment Employment Employment
Unemployment -103/-2918 1740/365 766/-738
123/41 109/81 568/122
Employment -953/-1515 -95/561 244/140 -141/329
98/68 483/698 150/194 731/960
Total -484/-2043 -95/561 870/206 77/209
221/109 483/698 259/275 963/1082
Note: Wealth is only observed annually, at quarter t and quarter t + ∆.
Employment transitions and savings are, respectively, the employment
and the average quarterly wealth variation between these two quarters.42
Table 4: Parameter Estimates and Asymptotic Standard Errors (in small fonts)
(r =0 .015, β =0 .98)
Blacks Whites
Parameter Θ Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2
Est. ASE Est. ASE Est. ASE Est. ASE
Θ1
Base unemp. arrival rate %: λ0 54.82 4.65 29.46 55.38 83.62 21.46 57.55 3.83
Base emp. arrival rate %: π0 17.43 0.73 78.17 28.29 9.89 6.19 53.42 11.64
Base layoﬀ rate %: θ0 22.44 3.13 17.27 14.08 7.22 0.78 13.25 2.10
Mean base log-wage dbn : µ 7.17 0.07 6.58 0.16 6.91 0.01 7.71 0.01
St. dev. base log-wage dbn: σ 0.59 0.05 0.63 0.07 0.50 0.02 0.45 0.03
Unemp. arrival rate growth ×102: αλ 1.94 0.50 11.86 42.04 7.58 2.31 1.09 0.43
Emp. arrival rate growth ×102: απ 0.76 0.25 0.16 0.36 3.20 2.00 0.16 0.17
Layoﬀ rate growth ×102: αθ -6.10 0.62 -1.87 2.53 -1.06 0.45 -3.65 0.67
Wage growth (linear) ×103: α1 8.57 1.79 1.28 0.64 9.04 0.19 14.42 1.63
Wage growth (quadratic) ×105: α2 -4.53 0.78 -3.36 2.67 -1.71 0.36 -24.14 2.21
Θ2
Borrowing Tightness %: s 0.43 0.04 1.29 0.27 4.85 0.42 4.90 2.31
Mean of log-wealth dbn : µ0 6.17 0.00 8.74 0.00 8.69 2.53 10.53 2.04
St. dev. of log-wealth dbn : σ0 0.04 0.34 0.33 0.42 1.73 1.09 1.84 0.98
Θ3
Unemployment Transfers: b 1049 73 389 237 515 41 326 209
Risk aversion γ 1.08 0.00 0.26 0.19 1.07 0.03 1.31 0.09
Disutility of working: ψ 0.20 0.06 0.86 6.21 0.11 0.03 0.21 0.07
Proportions of types %:
p111 43.59 3.45 39.33 2.59
p112 0.16 0.47
p121 26.33 8.63
p122 1.71 3.41 4.95 0.65
p211 21.38 0.12
p212 21.21 0.11 3.22 1.36
p221 7.16 30.96
Criterion value: χ2 266.16 340.5843
Table 5: Decomposition by Types of Selected Predicted Variables
Unemployment Rate, Wages and Wealth by Race, Type and Year
Variable Unemp. % Wage Wealth
Year Year Year
T y p e s 369 3 6 9 3 6 9
Blacks
p111 43.59 38 33 24 3226 3922 4620 3259 5332 8394
p121 26.33 40 32 23 3275 3920 4608 3587 5016 8019
p122 1.71 28 22 11 2935 3538 4163 752 -9 -511
p212 2 1 . 2 1743 2191 2449 2473 176 214 166
p221 7.16 42 30 26 2528 2789 2870 1176 1965 4170
Whites
p111 39.33 15 12 8 2345 2663 3063 4184 3188 2558
p112 0.16 64 65 70 3002 3393 3576 8057 9831 9887
p122 4.95 72 67 70 3084 3406 3564 11305 10075 9760
p211 2 1 . 3 8864 3988 4818 5266 4323 6992 17512
p212 3.22 64 61 31 4900 5653 5547 8528 10153 16726
p221 3 0 . 9 6964 4028 4833 5271 7842 8695 1858744
Table 6: Summary. Blacks and Whites: Actual and Predicted Choice Distribution.
Employment Status and Transitions for three selected Years after Graduation (in %)
Employment Years after Graduation
Variables Year 3 Year 6 Year 9
Act. Pred. χ2 Act. Pred. χ2 Act. Pred. χ2
Unemployment Rate
Blacks 34.2 31.3 2.5 19.3 24.8 9.7 19.7 18.3 0.7
Whites 18.3 16.3 2.5 10.9 12.9 2.8 8.8 9.8 0.9
Transitions
From Unemployment to Employment
Blacks 24.9 27.7 0.8 22.8 25.0 0.4 33.0 27.0 1.9
Whites 37.4 40.6 0.6 45.1 39.0 1.7 47.9 43.9 0.5
Transitions from Employment
Blacks: job separations 12.2 12.2 0.4 5.9 8.3 3.7 8.3 5.6 7.0
Blacks: job-to-job 9.5 10.3 8.2 8.4 7.4 7.0
Whites: job separations 8.4 7.9 1.5 6.5 6.2 0.1 5.6 4.6 5.3
Whites: job-to-job 11.3 10.2 8.5 8.4 5.2 7.0
Layoﬀ rate in job separations
Blacks 68.9 75.8 1.2 46.2 68.0 5.7 52.8 58.2 0.4
Whites 69.4 73.3 0.4 56.8 72.5 4.6 62.1 72.0 1.4
Layoﬀ rate in job-to-job transitions
Blacks 52.8 38.0 3.3 27.8 33.3 0.5 41.4 30.9 1.5
Whites 34.3 27.1 1.8 20.0 21.1 0.0 33.3 19.2 4.3
Crit. values at .5% signif.: χ2
(1) =7 .9, χ2
(2) =1 0 .6.45
Table 7: Summary. Blacks and Whites: Actual and Predicted Choice Distribution.
Wealth and Wages for three selected Years after Graduation
Years after Graduation
Wealth and Year 3 Year 6 Year 9
W a g e s B l a c k sW h i t e sB l a c k sW h i t e sB l a c k s W h i t e s
Act Pre Act Pre Act Pre Act Pre Act Pre Act Pre
Wealth Distribution:
A ≤ 0 2.8 6.7 7.8 14.1 5.7 6.0 13.8 12.2 6.2 5.5 10.7 7.6
0 <A≤ 10K 95.8 88.1 76.6 65.7 86.8 84.8 68.8 66.6 83.2 81.1 60.0 47.6
10K<A≤ 20K 0.0 4.4 10.9 13.1 4.7 6.9 10.9 14.3 6.2 9.4 12.1 22.0
20K<A≤ 30K 1.4 0.8 3.1 5.2 0.9 1.4 2.2 4.8 2.7 2.6 10.7 14.7
A>30K 0.0 0.1 1.6 1.9 1.9 0.9 4.3 2.1 1.8 1.4 6.4 8.1
χ2 5.6 3.7 2.1 6.8 1.5 14.5
Average Wealth 1393 2547 4921 5844 3381 3621 5664 6282 3702 4525 8780 11541
Black-White ratio 28 44 60 58 42 39
Wage Distribution:
w ≤ 2K 20.2 19.6 16.7 16.1 12.7 11.7 8.4 7.9 10.9 9.4 4.6 3.2
2K<w≤ 4K 61.3 66.6 58.2 57.5 60.7 63.5 50.7 50.3 56.1 51.6 38.2 45.6
4K<w≤ 6K 16.2 11.4 18.6 20.7 19.1 19.4 27.6 28.6 21.6 28.0 40.7 33.7
w>6K 2.3 2.4 6.5 5.7 7.5 5.5 13.2 13.2 11.4 11.0 16.5 17.6
χ2 8.6 2.3 4.1 0.5 8.8 22.8
Average Wage 3104 2876 3363 3345 3473 3403 4114 3945 3739 3934 4552 4362
Black-White ratio 92 86 84 86 82 90
Crit. values at .5% signif.: χ2
(3) =1 2 .8, χ2
(4) =1 4 .9.46
Table 8: Actual and Predicted First Unemployment Duration, First Accepted Wage,
and Savings and Frequencies in Employment Transitions
Variables Blacks Whites
Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
First Unemployment Spell Duration 4.2 3.2 2.5 2.7
First Accepted Wage 2236 2272 2291 2468
Savings and frequencies (below)
in transitions from
Unemployment to unemployment -101 -577 -2918 -1530
73.1 72.9 58.1 58.4
Unemployment to employment 1720 695 365 368
26.9 27.1 41.9 41.6
Employment to unemployment -953 -1002 -1514 -1512
9.4 8.9 6.3 6.2
Employment to same employment -73 404 545 480
81.7 82.2 85.2 84.7
Employment to new employment 243 239 139 425
8.8 8.9 8.5 9.147
Table 9: Regime Changes: Blacks with Whites’ Parameters
Variables Counterfactuals: Blacks with whites’
at First Blacks Labor Wealth Taste Labor Labor Wealth Whites
Unemp Spell Pred. Wealth Taste Taste Pred.
4th and 40th Quarter Parameters
a f t e rG r a d . (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Welfare 3661 5810 4102 217 21388 235 232 236
First unemployment spell
Duration 3.2 2.4 4.6 2.4 3.6 2.2 2.4 2.7
Wages 2272 2690 2618 2409 2138 2363 2015 2468
92 109 106 98 87 96 82 100
4th Quarter after Graduation
U n e m p l o y m e n t R a t e % 4 3 2 34 9 3 62 1 2 03 62 4
Exit from unemp. % 28 40 22 37 39 47 31 40
Job separations % 16 8 14 21 6 9 12 9
Transition job-to-job % 13 13 13 10 14 13 19 13
Wealth 1556 1218 7556 2206 4670 2517 7972 7842
20 16 96 28 60 32 102 100
Wages 2568 3145 2681 2386 2859 2819 2331 2885
89 109 93 83 99 98 81 100
Consumption 1783 2599 2900 1495 3618 2358 2323 2939
40th Quarter after Graduation
Unemployment Rate % 16 8 16 20 6 9 13 9
Exit from unemp. % 26 35 24 25 53 42 35 41
J o b s e p a r a t i o n s % 4 34 63 353
Transition job-to-job % 6 6 6 4 7 7 8 7
Wealth 5879 13435 4355 9301 121 15609 9383 15682
37 86 28 59 1 100 60 100
Wages 4191 4872 4206 4150 4452 4456 3658 4466
94 109 94 93 100 100 82 100
Consumption 3390 3804 3361 3024 3926 3490 2807 3518
Savings rates
Employed 12 19 13 18 8 18 19 18
Unemployed -22 -52 -20 -243 -131 -522 -470 -50248
Unemployed
λt 1 − λt








Figure 1: Transitions from Unemployment
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Figure 2: Transitions from Employment49
Quarters after Graduation
 Actual  Predicted








Figure 3: Blacks’ Hazard Rates: First Unemployment Spell
Quarters after Graduation
 Actual  Predicted








Figure 4: Whites’ Hazard Rates: First Unemployment Spell50
5a: Unemployment Rate by Quarter after Graduation. Blacks
Quarters








5b: Unemployment Rate by Quarter after Graduation. Whites
Quarters








5c: Transition: Unemployment to Employment. Blacks
Quarters









5d: Transition: Unemployment to Employment. Whites
Quarters









5e: Transition: Employment to Unemployment. Blacks
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5f: Transition: Employment to Unemployment. Whites
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5g: Transition: Employment Change. Blacks
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Figure 5: Actual and Predicted Paths by Race Group:
Employment Status and Employment Transitions51
5i: Transition to Unemployment: Layoff. Blacks
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5j: Transition to Unemployment: Layoff. Whites
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5k: Transition to Employment: Layoff. Blacks
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5l: Transition to Employment: Layoff. Whites
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Figure 5 (cont): Actual and Predicted Paths by Race Group:
Layoﬀs, Wealth, and Wages